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Background                                                                                                          
Adverse events are documented to affect more than one in 25 hospital patients. 
Medical mishaps and errors are rarely the result of incompetence, poor motivation or 
negligence but challenges on social and cognitive skills such as loss of situation 
awareness, poor communication, less than optimal teamwork, problematic stress 
management, and memory overload. Realising how prone we as humans are for short 
term memory loss, it is striking how many potentially dangerous medical procedures 
are based on “perfect” memory. 
The aims of this thesis were to develop and measure the effect of a pre-induction 
safety checklist in anaesthesia, explore the personnel’s acceptance and experience with 
this list, and further examine experiences with checklists in some non-medical high 
reliability organisations (HROs). This is organisations achieving high levels of safety 
despite facing considerable hazard and operational complexity 
Methods                                                                                                             
Statistical process control (SPC) was chosen as a quantitative approach to measure the 
effect of the pre-induction checklist implementation. Qualitative approaches using 
focus groups, key informant interviews, Delphi technique, and consensus process were 
utilized to develop the checklist and examine checklist experiences.
Results                                                                                                                    
During a study period of 13 weeks the 26 items checklist was used in 502 (61%) of 
829 anaesthesia inductions. One or more missing items were indentified in 17% (range 
4-46%) of these procedures. It took a median of 88.5 seconds (range 52-118) to 
perform the checklist.
Some participants were concerned that patients might have become anxious about 
possible unpreparedness since there was a “need” for a final check. The participants 
had, on their own initiative, adopted strategies to reduce this potential burden to the 
patients. The introduction of the checklist interrupted workflow by disturbing some of 
8the personnel’s own streamlined working habits or by causing redundant checks done 
by both nurses and physicians. Some participants had experienced negative or ironic 
comments from colleagues. They emphasised the importance of a supporting and 
motivating unit leader. Several of the participants had experienced increased 
confidence in performing challenging cases in unfamiliar places and situations. The 
participants discovered that the seven various operating theatres in which the checklist 
was used, were not designed and equipped in the same way. This highlighted the need 
for standardisation if the same checklist should be used in every operating theatre. 
The interviews with personnel from six HROs generated 84 crucial assertions in 
checklist development and implementation. Several of the informants underlined the 
importance of an early assessment if a checklist is the right tool to solve a specific 
problem. Proximity (defined as ownership and nearness in relation) for all 
stakeholders, directly or indirectly involved, was claimed to be a key-issue during 
checklist development. All informants also agreed that the design and length of 
checklists are vital. Major issues regarding checklist utilisation were: a predefined and 
agreed upon phraseology, understanding of the background of each point on the list, 
and to be aware of automaticity. Periodic revisions were described as important for 
two reasons; firstly to maintain an up-to-date checklist and secondly to build a culture 
in which the end-user feels that their feedback is valuable for the organisation.  
Conclusions                                                                                                                 
The introduction of safety checklists in health care is more difficult than it seems at 
first, and the best approach for achieving success and staff compliance is dependent on 
several factors. Our findings have provided some new insight in the challenges of 
developing and implementing checklists.
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1. Background 
“Medicine used to be simple, ineffective, and relatively safe.  
Now it is complex, effective, and potentially dangerous.”   
                                             Chantler C [1]
What were once considered medical miracles have now become routine treatment, but 
the increased complexity has led to a higher risk of harming the patient. Patient safety 
can be defined as freedom from accidental injury [2]. Harm or damage from medical 
therapy, in contrast to complications of a disease, has been termed adverse events (AE) 
[3]. All healthcare providers have a common goal to provide safe and high-quality 
care. But everyone will experience that AEs are, and will always be part of, the 
practise of medicine. The consequences of AEs can be devastating for the patient, their 
families, and also the healthcare providers involved (the latter are also called “the 
second victim”) [4]. AEs are documented to affect more than one in 25 hospital 
patients [5]. AE are rarely the result of incompetence, poor motivation or negligence 
[6]. There are numerous causes of AEs, often with several occurring at the same time, 
in a complex manner. Table 1 lists some examples of contributing factors that are 
reported to be associated with AEs. 
• Inadequate adverse event reporting systems 
• Not following agreed upon guidelines 
• Not seeking help when needed 
• Inadequate or not available supervision 
• Wrong treatment given, or treatment given to wrong patient 
• Inadequate handover and loss of crucial information
• Low quality communication 
• Failure to detect missing or not functioning equipment 
• Low compliance to carry out checks agreed upon
                                                                                                                                  
Table 1. Some examples of care management challenges that may be associated with 
AEs (modified from [7-9]).  
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Eliminating AEs is impossible because they are inherent parts of the complexity of 
modern medicine and large organisations, and hence AEs will always be around [10]. 
The major challenges are therefore how we harness the risks by identifying them or 
discover signs of failure, responding to them before patients injury has occurred, and 
to learn from them and hopefully be able to change our systems accordingly [11].  
In 2005 the World Health Organization (WHO), released a guideline for AE reporting 
and learning systems [3]. The subtitle of this guideline was “From information to 
action”. It is a demanding and complex task to implement effective actions in order to 
reduce the number of AEs. The contributing factors of AEs are rarely short-comings in 
factual knowledge and skills, the majority of AEs are attributed to “human vs. human” 
and “man vs. machine” interfaces [12]. These interactions have been called non 
technical skills (NTS) and relate to social and cognitive competencies, such as 
situation awareness, communication, teamwork, stress management and memory [13, 
14].  
In a highly complex organisation, such as health care, reliance on memory is a core 
issue. Memory can be divided into short term memory, long term memory, working 
memory and prospective memory [15] (Table 2). Short term memory is information 
stored for seconds to minutes such as looking at the speedometer when driving a car or 
remembering the last blood pressures values when monitoring a patient. It has been 
stated that seven is the “magical” number of items that limits our capacity for short 
term memory [16]. Information that is possible to recall after a longer period is long 
term memory. This information has been stored by cramming (e.g. learning by rote) or 
by doing repeated tasks. Working memory is an interaction between short- and long 
term memory needed to do complex tasks such as reasoning, reflection and learning. 
Working memory is about using different kinds of memory, perception and experience 
in order to solve a specific operation [17, 18]. Performing a check before anaesthesia 
requires new information about the specific patient combined with memorized general 
information. Prospective memory is the ability to remember or continue a task as 
planned after a delay or disruption [19]. Interruptions are frequent in a hectic clinical 
environment and most health care workers will recognize these as normal. Delays and 
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other unforeseen events are common challenges in most professions and in our daily 
life. The consequences of forgetting an important step may be fatal in a nuclear power 
plant or anaesthesia, but acceptable in the grocery store. Failure in prospective 
memory has accordingly been claimed a threat to patient safety [20].  
Type of memory Definition Example 
Short term memory New information stored for seconds or minutes 
Monitoring the speedometer 
when driving.  
Long term memory Stored information that is possible to recall 
Cramming a foreign language 
or repeatedly operations  
Working memory 
Memory needed to perform complex 
tasks such as reasoning, reflection 
and learning 
Performing a pre-induction 
check. 
Prospective memory 
The ability to remember or continue 
a task as planned after a delay or 
interruption 
A surgeon being interrupted 
during a demanding period of 
the surgery or a father with his 
crying child in the 
supermarket 
Table 2. Classification of different types of memory (modified from [15]). 
In 2000 the Institute of Medicine published the report “To Err Is Human: Building a 
Safer health System” [2]. This report was regarded a milestone in patient safety 
worldwide. The report gives five principles for designing safety systems in health care 
organisations. One of these principles is to respect human limitations and avoiding 
reliance on memory. Realising how prone we as humans are for short term memory 
loss, it is striking how many potentially dangerous medical procedures that are based 
on “perfect” memory [19]. 
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1.1 The start in aviation 
When the term “checklist” is used, most people will associate the word with aviation, 
pilots, cockpits, and aircrafts. The systematic use of safety checklists also started in 
aviation [21]. In October 1935, the U.S. Army held a flight demonstration with the 
new Boeing 299 in Dayton, Ohio. This four engine aircraft could fly longer, faster and 
carry more bomb loads than any other previous military aircraft. After take-off, in 
front of generals and manufacturing executives, the aircraft stalled and crashed in a 
blazing explosion [22]. This event was sentinel because of it’s consequences for 
further training of U.S. army pilots. Investigation showed that the crash had been due 
to “pilot error”. It was stated after the accident that due to the complexity, this aircraft 
was “too much airplane for one man to fly”. Instead of harder and longer training for 
the crews they came up with a simple approach; a pilot’s checklist [21]. With the 
checklist in hand, pilots went on to fly the Boeing 299 (which is nicknamed the B-17) 
for a more than 1.8 million miles without one serious incidence. Since 1935 the pilots’ 
checklists have been the cornerstone in flight safety. It has been stated that medicine 
now is about to enter its “B-17 phase” [23], indicating that the complexity has 
exceeded the capability for “one man”, without help or cognitive tools, to perform safe 
quality care. 
               
Illustration 1. The end of B-17, Wright Field, Ohio, October 30, 1935. 
Aviation belongs to a type of organisations called high reliability organisations
(HRO). HROs are organisations achieving very high levels of safety, resulting in fewer 
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than expected accidents, despite facing considerable hazards and operational 
complexity [24]. Nuclear power production, aerospace industry, fire fighting, military 
operations, and engineering also represent examples of such organisations. Some 
characteristics of HROs are their preoccupation with the possibility of failure, 
resistance to oversimplification, commitment to resilience and self-preservation, 
deference to shifting locations of expertise, and prevention of small mishaps to 
escalate [25]. Checklists are commonly used in HROs, and these organisations have 
decades of experience with checklist development and their implementation.  
  
1.2 Safety checklists 
There is no uniform definition of “checklists” in health care.  However, the most 
common understanding is that a checklist is a cognitive tool that can help us to 
remember and perform tasks or operations. These can vary from as simple as not 
forgetting to buy milk at the grocery, to commanding an aircraft carrier [26]. Some 
checklists are performed as background checks when planning an activity, others 
checks are performed immediately before a procedure is about to start, e.g. the pilot’s 
before-take-off checklist [19]. The latter checks allow errors occurring at an earlier 
stage in the “causation chain” to be detected. Such checklists are commonly called 
safety checks.
In medicine, there are many other tools that help us to perform various tasks safely. 
Terms as clinical and practice guidelines, treatment protocols, a variety of algorithms, 
and diagnostic criteria are often used interchangeably with checklists, but differ 
substantially from a safety checklist. A clinical guideline or a treatment protocol gives 
a kind of “recipe” to support and guide decision making and planned interventions. 
They are also introduced to improve workflow and reduce variation [26]. The Institute 
of Medicine defines clinical guidelines as “systematically developed statements to 
assist practitioner and patient decisions about appropriate health care for specific 
clinical circumstances” [2]. A safety checklist is an overriding aid to ensure that 
planned activities or operations are performed in a certain manner and order [27]. In 
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our department we have a difficult airway algorithm and a safety checklist. The 
algorithm guides the clinical decisions and the pre-induction checklist ensures that the 
equipment is available and functioning, and hence improves preparedness.  
Generally, a checklist is indented to be a memory aid, but have several other functions. 
One objective is enhancing the team’s preparedness by keeping the team members “in 
the loop”, promoting a higher level of situation awareness, and improving 
communication [28]. Checklists can also serve as a quality control tool. In aviation 
checklists are viewed as a tool to structure the man-machine interfaces [29].  
There are mainly two methods of conducting a safety checklist. The do list where the 
checklist is used to lead the operation step by step, and the challenge-response list 
where the operation is prepared according to normal standard procedures, where the 
checklist is used to verify or check each item as they are performed or checked. The 
challenge-response method is used in cockpits and is also the most frequently used 
method in medicine. In this thesis the term “checklist” is used synonymous with a 
“safety checklist”. 
1.3 Checklists in medicine 
Checklists, in various forms, have probably been used as memory aid from the dawn 
of health care. The ABC (Airway, Breathing and Circulation) principle in first aid is a 
well-known type of checklist. The letters are easy to remember, reminds us of the most 
important interventions in a chronological and medically correct order. Interestingly, it 
is also used by both laypersons and professionals. The ABC checklist is short, and 
designed for emergency situations. On the other hand, the WHO checklist for 
influenza pandemic preparedness planning, contains 39 pages and 168 items [30]. To 
prepare for a pandemic requires a completely different tool than what is needed when 
treating a critically ill or injured patient. However, both checklists are useful in their 
context. 
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A literature search on the PubMed database revealed an increasing number of 
published scientific papers regarding safety checklists since the IOM report in 2000, 
with a dramatic increase the last few years (search words: [checklist AND safety] 
(Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. The number of scientific publications on safety checklists listed  
on PubMed from 2001-2010. 
As an example from medicine, important steps in preparation for surgical procedures 
are frequently missed [31, 32]. Preoperative checklists have shown to reduce problems 
with surgical equipment during the procedures [33] and anaesthetic set-up [34]. Poor 
inter-professional communication is also known to often play a part in the 
development of adverse events [2, 35]. Two clinical intervention studies among 
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surgeons, nurses, and anaesthesiologists have shown to reduce the number of 
communication failures and also to improve team cohesion [36, 37]. 
Checklists are shown to be effective tools ensuring that specific care processes were 
performed according to plan and established protocols. One study reported an 
increased number of patients receiving treatment according to the local protocols after 
the implementation of a “clinical pathway checklist” [38]. Another clinical pathway 
checklist has demonstrated to reduce the length of post operative stay [39]. In a similar 
study a 16 items checklist identified that several specific aspects of care were not 
delivered when appropriate [40]. Further, a mandatory verbal review of a checklist was 
an effective method to improve both considerations and implementation of best 
clinical practise in a surgical/burn/trauma ICU [41]. The three latter studies have in 
common that none of the actual clinical guidelines were new or modified, they just 
weren’t always followed. The single and simple intervention was the introduction of a 
checklist! 
In 2004, Peter Pronovost and colleagues at Johns Hopkins University Hospital, 
achieved a significant decrease in catheter related infections after introduction of a 
simple checklist ensuring that established guidelines were followed [42]. They 
calculated that during a period of five years, the checklist had prevented forty-three 
infections and eight deaths and thereby saved about two million US dollars per year. In 
a follow up study including 106 ICUs, these findings were confirmed [43]. Pronovost 
was among the first to recognize and document, the checklist’s power to improve care 
processes and thereby save lives.  
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Figure 2. The WHO Surgical Safety Checklist. 
A milestone for safety checklists in medicine was the Second Global Patient Safety 
Challenge: “Safe Surgery Saves Lives” initiative, launched by the WHO in 2008 [44]. 
One of the final products of this program was the Surgical Safety Checklist (Figure 2 
and appendix 1) [45]. This checklist is conducted in the operating theatre and consists 
of three parts; Sign in, Time out, and Sign out. This checklist was piloted in 8 hospitals 
worldwide during 2007-2008 to study whether it actually improved safety. 
Complication rates dropped significantly and the in-hospital mortality decreased from 
1.5% to 0.8% after the introduction of the checklist [46]. Today, this checklist 
apparently has been implemented in over 3000 hospitals worldwide [47]. 
Parallel to the development of the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist the Surgical Patient 
Safety System (SURPASS) checklist was developed and implemented in the 
Netherlands [48]. This checklist follows the surgical pathway from admission to 
discharge. The number of complications decreased significantly and the in-hospital 
mortality decreased from 1.5% to 0.8% [49]. 
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The WHO Surgical Safety Checklist is perhaps the most widely cited and debated 
safety checklist in medicine. This may have contributed to the increased interest for 
safety checklist since 2008. Table 3 shows some selected publications from studies on 
the effects of checklists, and also the diversity of the study aims.  
Author and year of publication  Aims 
Wollf AM et al. 2004 [38] Whether the quality of hospital inpatient care was improved 
Romagnuolo J et al.2005 [39] To measure the length of post-operative hospital stay 
Hart EM et al. 2005 [34] Whether a checklist helped in preparation for general anaesthesia 
Hewson KM et al. 2006 [40] Whether certain care processes were performed systematically in the ICU 
Pronovost P et al. 2006 [43] Incidence of ICU catheter-related bloodstream infections  
Verdaasdonk EGG et al. 2008 [33] Whether a checklist reduced the number of incidents with laparoscopic equipment 
Lingard L et al. 2008 [37] Whether structured team briefings improve operating room communication 
Byrnes MC et al. 2009 [41] Whether clinical considerations were improved and practice patterns changed 
Haynes AB et al. 2009 [46] Complications and morbidity associated with surgery 
De Vries EN et al. 2010 [49] To compare complications and mortality in surgery
                                                                                                                                  
Table 3: Some examples of safety checklist effect studies and their aims. 
So there are numerous publications indicating that checklists are useful and effective 
in improving quality of care. On the other hand, we have not identified studies 
claiming that checklists have decreased patient safety. Despite this, there seems to be 
challenges adopting this seemingly very effective tool. 
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1.4 The challenge  
Since 2007, numerous reports on challenges with checklist acceptance and inadequate 
suggestions for checklist development and use have been published [50-53]. Similarly, 
reports about weaknesses in guidelines for clinical protocol development also have 
been reported [54-56]. Checklists can improve quality of care, however there are at 
least two major challenges. Firstly, attitudes towards checklists vary and secondly, 
although checklist implementation might seem deceptively simple, their development 
and use is a rather complex issue. 
Quality improvement and resistance to change 
Any kind of quality improvement means some type of change, but any change doesn’t 
necessarily guarantee that the quality improvement has occurred. Changing behaviour 
is never easy and therefore some resistance always accompanies a change or 
improvement process [57]. This is especially the case in medicine, which tend to be a 
rather slow-changing part of society. Even well documented improvements can take 
many years before being adopted by all. Examples of this are the low implementation 
rate of therapeutic hypothermia after cardiac arrest [58], and beta-blocker use after 
myocardial infarction [59]. 
There are numerous reasons why some people resist change, but this can be on the 
personal level like loss of freedom or more work. Further, misunderstanding the aims 
and consequences of the proposed change, or a belief that the change does not make 
sense. It can also be a result from lack or limited trust in leadership [60]. Individuals 
neither “buy in” nor adapt innovations at the same time. A few people are “innovators” 
who greet new ideas and changes always welcome. The majority are “early adaptors” 
or “late adaptors”, while a few are “laggards” who have an inherent scepticism to all 
types of change [57]. Understanding how resistance to change can be handled is 
crucial to success. Introduction of aviation style challenge-response checklists in 
medicine may be perceived as a major change in “our own way of doing things” and 
consequently lead to a diversity of adapting behaviours.   
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Checklist development and implementation 
Prior to the first article in 2007, only one medical publication concerning checklist 
development was indentified [61]. A more extensive search identified several non-
medical organisations with experience in checklist development and implementation. 
In aviation, where an established checklist culture exists, we indentified three reports 
[28, 29, 62]. These reports have limited content on checklist scepticism or key issues 
regarding first time development. On the other hand they present a thorough guidance 
on design, correct use, checklist objectives, types of checklists, certification, and 
standardisation.  
Unlike health care, HROs have succeeded to create checklist acceptance and 
experience in development and use. The extensive experience gained in aviation and 
other HROs can be a valuable and unutilized source of learning. The challenges with 
acceptance and development may have a common feature. This thesis focuses on the 
understanding of safety checklist development, implementation, and acceptance in 
health care. 
My vision is that the science of how to do checklists is in its infancy
Pronovost P. [53] 
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2. Aims of the study 
To better understand some of the effects of a checklist, and the challenges its 
development and implementation represent we conducted three studies. 
Study I: The possible causes of several adverse events in our department were 
identified as lack of, or malfunctioning equipment or improper use, or missing 
medications. The aim of this study was to develop and implement a pre-induction 
checklist to identify and ideally solve these problems before the induction of 
anaesthesia. The outcome measures were: Staff compliance, number of identified 
missing items, and time spent on using the checklist. 
Study II: Despite the successful effect on reducing number of missing required items 
in Study I, challenges with compliance and scepticism towards the checklist were 
evident. Informal discussions among the nurses and physicians were also observed, 
sharing valuable insight into issues and experiences regarding checklist use. Based on 
these observations, the aim of the second study was to further explore nurses’ and 
physicians’ acceptance of and experience with the new safety checklist. 
Study III: The study setting in Study I and II were limited to one anaesthetic 
department. The aim of the third study was to explore ideas and lessons learned from 
checklist development and implementation in a group of non-medical HROs. 
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3. Methods 
To pursuit the aims of the three studies a combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches were employed. Statistical process control (SPC) was chosen as 
the most suitable quantitative approach to measure the effect of the novel pre-
induction checklist implementation in Study I. Qualitative approaches using focus 
groups, key informant interviews, Delphi technique, and consensus process were 
utilised to answer the questions posed in Study II and III. 
A brief outline of the methods is described in this section, and further methodological 
considerations are presented in the Discussion section.  
Study I 
In this study the development and implementation of a pre-induction checklist in an 
anaesthesia and intensive care department of a tertiary teaching hospital is presented. 
We used a modified Delphi technique to design the checklist and SPC to measure 
number of identified missing items and personnel compliance. 
Delphi technique 
The term “Delphi” goes back to the oracle of Delphi in ancient Greek mythology [63]. 
This method is defined as series of questionnaires (“rounds”) interspersed by 
controlled feedback from the participants and the moderator [64]. The main goal is to 
gather the most reliable consensus of opinions from a group of experts [65, 66]. Since 
its introduction in the late 1940s, the method has been used in more than 1000 
scientific publications [67].  The Delphi technique is suitable in situations where the 
participants have a strong personality. Anonymity enables the participants to learn and 
get ideas from each other, without being provoked, influenced, or lead by any of the 
other participants [66]. 
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The development of the checklist itself was a three-step process. First, adverse event 
reports, literature search and expert opinion were used to develop the first version of 
the checklist. Secondly, a modified Delphi approach was employed to construct the 
second version. This use of the method was considered “modified” as the experts were 
consultant anaesthesiologists in our department and the “rounds” were both verbally 
and in writing. The consultants were asked to add or remove checklist items through 
an anonym two-step revision process. Thirdly, the final version was made after pilot 
testing (Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Development process of the pre-induction checklist.
Statistical Process Control (SPC) 
SPC was developed in the 1920s by the physicist Walter Shewart to improve industrial 
manufacturing [68]. SPC is a statistical method to monitor a process during its run, and 
has three goals: 1) understanding the process itself, 2) understanding the causes of 
process variation and, 3) elimination or limitation of these causes [69]. Unlike other 
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quantitative statistical methods, SPC monitors the process on an ongoing basis, 
checking whether the process is deviating from the expected pattern. SPC combines 
the rigour of classical statistical methods and the effect of time (time sensitivity) as 
data is plotted consecutively. SPC has shown to be a feasible and very useful method 
to measure quality improvement in medicine [70-72]. We used SPC with so-called 
control charts to describe and quantify process variability. There were two main 
outcome measures; number of missing items identified by the checklist and the 
personnel’s checklist compliance. 
Study II 
Focus groups 
In Study II the nurses’ and physicians’ acceptance and experiences with the novel pre-
induction checklist used in Study I was explored. Both quantitative and qualitative 
methods have previously been used to explore opinions and experiences [36, 48, 61].  
We selected a qualitative approach to explore experiences in greater depth than what 
would be possible in a quantitative study (e.g. a questionnaire survey on pre-selected 
topics). A focus group is a semi-structured group interview moderated by a researcher 
[73]. A group discussion will also allow the participants to reflect upon what the other 
participants say, unlike individual interviews where the single informant do not get 
any other input, alternative views, or experiences [74].  
Study setting
The informants were all involved in the development, implementation, and use of the 
pre-induction checklist introduced in Study I. The interviews were carried out one, and 
five months after Study I was completed. During this period the original list was 
become part of the department’s standard routines. Most informants were not relieved 
from their duties for the sessions, and regularly experienced disturbances from 
telephones and pagers during the interviews. Some informants chose to come 
voluntarily on their day off, and were not disturbed.  
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Participants  
We used a purposeful sample of the involved personnel. This type of sampling is in 
contrast to random sampling, a method to recruit informants who are believed to be 
more suitable to answer the actual research questions [75]. The total number of 
potential informants in our study was 34. From this group, we recruited both the most 
and the least experienced nurse on duty during the actual interview day. Gender was 
not considered to be a relevant factor. Some informants were interviewed before or 
after their “on-call” the actual day. The expected contribution from each informant and 
practicalities are considered important factors in decisions about group size. Six to ten 
informants are believed to be optimal [73]. We decided that a group size of five to 
eight informants would be suitable and also possible to organize within a hectic 
clinical environment. A total of fourteen informants (nine nurses, four residents and 
one consultant) with 1 - 23 years of experience were included in the two focus groups. 
Interviews
Each interview lasted 60 minutes with OT as the moderator. The interview guide 
consisted of broad, open-ended questions (e.g., “Tell me about your experiences with 
the checklist use” and “How do you think the checklist use affected daily routines”). 
The main findings from the first interview were used to modify the questions used in 
the second interview. The interviews were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
Analysis
The analysis was performed in collaboration between OT and AE. Unlike OT, AE had 
minimal personal or professional insight in our department. On the other hand, he has 
a thorough experience in qualitative research and sharp-end use of checklists in 
radiology.  
A systematic text condensation inspired from Giorgi and modified by Malterud was 
used [76, 77]. The analysis comprised the following steps: 1) Reading the transcripts 
to get an overall impression, 2) Identifying text units relevant to the aim and code 
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these, 3) Interpreting similar codes for a common meaning, and 4) Summarising the 
content within the coded groups into descriptions reflecting the most important issues. 
Validation was made by comparing each description to the interview context and the 
transcripts, searching for disproving data. In addition the informants were asked to 
read and confirm that they recognised their described opinions (member check). 
Study III 
In this study ideas and lessons learned from checklist development and 
implementation in a group of six non-medical HROs were explored. Key informant 
interviews and field notes were used to generate assertions and recommendations. A 
total of 84 assertions for checklist development and implementation were identified 
during the process. Seventeen of the assertions were excluded from the analysis 
because they were not easily transferable to health care. Examples were: “Checklists 
can not be written, they must be learned by memory”, to prevent the enemy identifying 
captured soldiers. Further, “A checklist must be as long as it takes to get the job done 
in a safe manner”, said from the nuclear power production who do not have time 
critical events during normal operations, unlike normal workflow in an anaesthesia or 
intensive care unit where time is often a limit. 
These assertions were further analysed using a Delphi process (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4: Flow of the analysis of the key informant interviews and application of the 
Delphi process. 
Key informant interviews 
Traditionally, key informant interviews are used in ethnographic research studying 
culture and community, but the technique is also used in health care research. The key 
informants differ from other informants by the nature of their position within a culture 
or context studied. They have a particular in-depth knowledge about the research aim 
and hence, possess the ability to articulate this to the researcher [75]. Unlike focus 
groups, in depth interviews make it possible to discuss sensitive topics and receive 
candid information.  
Participants and interviews
Six HROs (nuclear power production, off-shore oil production, civil aviation, 
submarine operations, military special operations, and military aviation) were 
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contacted by telephone and introduced to the study aims. The organisations were 
kindly asked to identify one or two informants, who then underwent a pilot telephone 
interview to ensure that they had comprehensive experience in checklist development. 
Further inclusion criteria were “sharp-end” experience with checklists, in addition to a 
comprehensive cultural understanding of their own organisation. One informant was 
excluded because he had not been using checklists for the last ten years. The eight 
informants, all males, had 10 - 30 years of experience with checklists. As the 
informants had some restrictions on sharing standing operating procedures with the 
public, they had to have an organisational standing giving them permission to disclose 
and discuss potentially sensitive information. 
Six of the experts underwent a semi-structured interview at their work place, and two 
were interviewed by telephone. Field notes were taken during parts of interviews when 
audio recording was inconvenient or not permitted (e.g. during a tour of the nuclear 
plant or inside the parachute packing area). The interviews (lasting 45 to 90 minutes) 
were audiotape recorded and transcribed by OT.  
Analysis
All transcripts and field notes were reviewed by two of the authors (OT & GB) who 
identified and agreed on 8–12 citations from each informant. These citations were 
assertions regarding important issues and elements in checklist development and 
implementation. The assertions were then returned to the informants for validation 
(member check), resulting in only minor revisions. 
The authors (except AE) who all have previous experience with quality improvements 
projects analysed the assertions from the interviews in a three-step Delphi approach. 
We thought health care workers were more likely than the HRO informants, to assess 
whether assertions were relevant to the medical field. Initially, each of the researchers 
proposed groups and subgroups of the assertions, and then they pinpointed the most 
important assertions. Thereafter, a consensus meeting was arranged in which the 
identified groups and subgroups where further discussed. OT & GB performed the 
final analysis and then all members agreed on the result. 
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4. Synopsis of results 
In the following the results from each study are presented individually. In the 
discussion section the results from each study will be linked together and put into a 
broader perspective. 
Study I 
Thomassen O, Brattebo G, Softeland E, Lossius HM, Heltne JK.  
The effect of a simple checklist on frequent pre-induction deficiencies. 
Acta Anaesthesiologica Scandinavica. 2010;54:1179-84. 
In Study I a new pre-induction checklist in an anaesthesia and intensive care 
department was developed and implemented. The checklist (Figure 5) contained 26 
items. The graphical layout was made by a professional designer and foliated in 
pocketsize. The lists were made available in every operating room and attached to 
every anaesthesia machine.  
The checklist was used in 502 patients. One or more missing items were indentified in 
17% (85 checklists), with a range from 4-46% on a weekly basis (Figure 4 in Paper I). 
The checklist was performed in 61% of all anaesthesias during the study period. 
During these 13 weeks there were three weeks with a special cause of variation 
(defined as results lower or higher than +/- 3 SD from the mean) (Figure 3 in Paper I). 
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Figure 5. Final English version of the pre-induction checklist (original Norwegian 
version in Appendix 2).
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It took a median of 88.5 seconds to perform the checklist (range 52-118). The mean 
time spent in the operating theatre, defined as time from the patient came through the 
door to start of induction, was not significantly different after the introduction of the 
checklist (25.1 minutes, n = 502 vs. 24.3 minutes, n = 502, t-test 1.15, P = 0,25). 
Use and identified missing items
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Figure 6. Proportion of patients in whom the checklist was used, and identified 
missing items. 
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Study II
Thomassen O, Brattebo G, Heltne JK, Softeland E, Espeland A.  
Checklists in the operating room: Help or hurdle?  
A qualitative study on health workers' experiences.  
BMC Health Services Research 2010;10:342. 
In the second paper nurses’ and physicians’ acceptance and experience with the safety 
checklist was explored. The participants’ views and experiences were summarised in 
five categories; the patient, the workflow, the attitude from colleagues, and last, spin-
off effects and need for standardisation. 
The checklist could divert attention away from the patient
The participants thought most patients did not notice that a new tool was introduced in 
the pre-induction stage. But a few participants were concerned that some patients 
might have become anxious about possible unpreparedness since there was a “need” 
for a final check. However, the participants had, on their own initiative, made 
strategies to reduce this potential burden on the patients. Avoiding turning the back to 
the patient during checklist conduction, completing as much as possible of the 
checklist before the patient arrived if extra patient attention seemed needed, and 
providing clear and calm information, were such strategies used to overcome these 
problems. 
The checklist influenced workflow and doctor-nurse cooperation
The introduction of the checklist interrupted workflow by disturbing personal and 
streamlined working habits or causing redundant checks by the nurses and physicians.  
Senior consultants were both sceptical and supportive
Some participants had experienced negative or ironic comments from colleagues. They 
emphasised the importance of a supporting and motivating leader. 
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The checklist improved confidence in unfamiliar contexts
Several of the participants had used the checklist when performing anaesthetic work 
outside of the department where the study was performed, experiencing increased 
confidence in doing challenging work in unfamiliar places and situations. 
The checklist revealed insufficient equipment standardisation
During the study period the participants discovered that the seven different operating 
theatres, in which the checklist was used, were not identically designed and equipped. 
This observation highlighted the need for standardisation if the same checklist should 
be used in all operating theatres. 
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Study III
Thomassen O, Espeland A, Softeland E, Lossius HM, Heltne JK, Brattebo G. 
Implementation of checklists in health care; learning from high-reliability 
organisations. 
Scandinavian Journal of Trauma, Resuscitation and Emergency Medicine. In press.
Study III explored ideas and lessons learned from checklist development and 
implementation in a group of six non-medical HROs. The interviews generated 84 
assertions for checklist development and implementation. These were categorized into 
five main groups with further subgroups. 
Assumptions for checklist acceptance
Several of the informants underlined two critical assumptions before introducing a 
checklist; firstly, the importance of an early assessment whether a checklist is the right 
tool to help solve a specific problem. Secondly, that the end-user must not feel that he 
or she is denied opportunity to applying common sense in a given situation. 
Stakeholders in checklist development
Proximity to the actual process for which introduction of a checklist is planned 
(defined as ownership and nearness in relation) for all stakeholders, directly or 
indirectly involved, was claimed to be a key-issue during checklist development. 
Characteristics of the checklist itself
All informants agreed that the design of checklists is important. Table 4 lists some 
relevant points regarding checklist length, graphical lay-out, and content.  
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• Length 
• Limiting the length is crucial for feasibility and 
usefulness 
• Careful about gradually extending a well-adapted list 
• Lay-out  
• Adapting to the surroundings in which the list is to be 
used 
• Using a professional graphic designer 
• Content 
• Identifying and prioritising items by scrutinising actual 
adverse events 
• Content must directly reflect the specific operation  
• Communication • Using well-known professional and scientific terminology 
                                                                                                                                  
Table 4. Important issues regarding checklist length, lay-out, and content.  
Human factors during checklist utilisation
Important issues regarding checklist use were: a predefined and agreed upon 
phraseology, the understanding of the text must be clearly defined, to be aware of 
automaticity and a good understanding of the background of each item on the list. 
Revisions and validation
All the informants described a thorough system for maintaining a checklist. Periodic 
revisions were described as important for two reasons; firstly to maintain an up-to-date 
checklist, and secondly, to build a culture where the sharp-end users feel that their 
feedback is received as a valuable input for the organisation.
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5. Discussion 
Quality is a never ending cycle of continuous improvement. 
          Edvards Deming [69] 
In Study I it was found that a pre-induction checklist was a suitable and effective tool 
to detect and also help correcting missing or malfunctioning equipment. Despite the 
success in detecting and solving problems with missing items, the low personnel 
compliance raised new questions and fuelled the need for further exploration of the 
participants’ experiences in Study II. Based on these findings, but also similar 
experiences from other studies, like the implementation of the WHO Surgical Safety 
Checklist worldwide, we realized that development and implementation of checklists 
are a complex and resource-demanding exercise. Study III explored the extensive 
experiences gained in aviation and other non-medical HROs.  
Study I – III describe the journey from identification of a local problem with adverse 
events, through the development of a new checklist, the need for a thorough study 
involving our local experiences regarding implementation, and finally to explore ideas 
and lessons learned in some non-medical HROs with decades of checklist experience.  
In the following the results from the studies will be discussed with respect to the 
relevance of human memory, and situation awareness. Methodological considerations 
and ethical issues are also examined. 
5.1 Checklist scepticism
Initially we thought that developing a safety checklist would be a fairly simple 
process. However, soon we experienced that some personnel made jokes and did not 
believe in the project. At a time the negative feedback almost terminated further 
progress.  
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It has been stated that the checklist concept could easily be implemented into each 
physician’s own operating room protocol [78]. One might assume that adoption and 
implementation of an effective and low-cost intervention could easily be done, but 
implementing checklists or procedures can interfere with the established organisational 
culture and some resistance to change will certainly develop [53, 79, 80]. According to 
previous statement, checklist implementation should be an easy task, but that was not 
the case. Pronovost and colleagues also experienced this after the successful study 
demonstrating a significant decrease in central line infection by simply employing a 
short checklist [43]. Despite the promising results adopters were slow to follow. He 
travelled around the US showing his results in dozens of hospitals, but still few 
adopted the idea [21]. Pronovost is not the only one who has had to deal with 
resistance in checklist implementation. Few, if any, innovations in quality and safety 
have easily achieved successful implementation without “fighting” scepticism [81]. 
The implementation of the WHO surgical safety checklist was also met with similar 
resistance and debate. In the British Medical Journal, some surgeons raised concerns 
about negative staff and embarrassments due to obvious items. They meant that that an 
inappropriate checklist, rigidly enforced is counterproductive [82, 83]. 
In Study III the informants were asked about their opinions regarding checklist 
acceptance. Several of the informants stressed the importance that all stakeholders, 
particularly the end-users, must be involved from the start. The critical time is not 
when the checklist development commences, but when the discussion whether a 
checklist is the right tool to solve the problem or not, begins. Perhaps the experiences 
regarding scepticism towards the new checklist in Study I could have been alleviated if 
a more transparent discussion about methods and needs had been done during the 
planning stage. The results from Study II expressed that backing and encouragement 
from the leaders was important to reduce scepticism. In Study I the staff compliance 
with the checklist ranged from 29% - 95% (Figure 6). Before the two weeks with more 
than 90% use, the lead consultant had sent an e-mail to all involved personnel with 
encouragements to use the checklist. Similar results have been confirmed during the 
introduction of the WHO surgical checklist [51] and team training [84].  
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Creating checklist enthusiasm should be initiated a long time before the actual 
implementation starts. Table 5 is based on the findings from Study II and III, and lists 
some assertions on how to increase checklist acceptance.  
• There must be a predefined and agreed problem 
• A checklist is decided the right tool for possibly solving that problem 
• The department head and other leaders are enthusiastic 
• Local champions are identified and used 
• Local opponents are encouraged to speak up
                                                                                                                                  
Table 5. Assertions on how to prevent scepticism and checklist resistance.  
It has been stated that sceptical personnel can be inspired to support change, but this is 
a rather long and demanding process [85]. When introducing checklists into practise, 
recognising compliance issues is an important first step. According to the findings in 
Study II and III, including all stakeholders from the start and ensuring support from 
leaders are key requirements for success. 
5.2 Challenges in checklist development 
Implementation of checklists is not a simple matter of handing them out and 
requesting personnel to follow them. ”Checklists are not Harry Potter’s wand” [53]. 
After Study II was performed in 2008, several publications reported challenges in 
checklist development and inertia to integrating them into clinical practise.  
Barriers to successful implementation are diverse and involve different issues 
including communication, logistics and interpersonal relations. Table 6 lists some of 
these barriers. 
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• Feeling of unfamiliarity with the list 
• Embarrassment of having to articulate the obvious 
• Strong hierarchy which limit communication  
• Negative impact on workflow and delays 
• Feeling of checklist as irrelevant or unnecessary 
• Poor performance when conducting the checklist 
• Lack of local adaptations
                                                                                                                                  
Table 6: Reported challenges with checklist development and use [50-52, 86].
Some of the findings in Study II and III are similar to the ones listed in Table 6, but 
some of the other findings do not seem to have been discussed in previous research. In 
Study II the informants had concerns that some patients might become anxious when 
observing the checklist procedure being conducted. Such concerns may reinforce the 
feeling of unfamiliarity among personnel. Potential negative effects to the patients 
must be taken into account when new checklists are introduced. 
Performing the checklist in Study I revealed insufficient equipment standardisation in 
the operating theatres, and this could have caused some of the non-adherence and 
scepticism. Such findings underline the importance of locally adapted checklists. In 
our department the various operating theatres are designed for specific surgical 
procedures and the needs for adapting the checklists are present.  
In study III the informants from the HROs all agreed on the importance of proximity 
for all stakeholders. The surgical safety checklist has been implemented with minimal 
collaboration with the end-users in some other units in our hospital (personal 
communication). Regardless of the impressive results presented in New England 
Journal of Medicine [46], a too simple implementation in these departments may have 
increased checklist resistance and complicated a successful implementation process.  
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5.3 Guidelines for checklist development 
When Study I was started, most publications on checklist development were from non-
medical organisations. However, one publication was identified, and the aim of this 
was to develop a checklist to promote interprofessional communication in the OR [61]. 
A four step approach was used in the development; collecting of information, editing 
the first checklist draft, piloting, and final brief informal interviews. Feasibility and 
maintaining workflow were key elements in the developing process.  
The development of the WHO surgical checklist was inspired from the aviation 
industry and focused on five important issues: content and format, follow the natural 
flow of work (workflow patterns), trial and feedback, evaluation, and local adaptation. 
The experiences from Study I and II indicate that a successful checklist 
implementation requires some additional steps: awareness of the patients’ 
understanding of the situation, and the importance of involving the negative, and non-
adhering personnel. Study III adds the importance of proximity to the developing 
process for all stakeholders. In addition there must be agreement on the problem the 
checklist is intended to solve. 
The team who developed the SURPASS checklist performed a more thorough and 
extensive method compared to the WHO surgical checklist [48]. They used a three 
step approach; 1) Developing a prototype using literature and adverse events, 2) A 
three step validation study using observational study and expert panel, and 3) 
Evaluation of usability by interviewing the sharp-end personnel.  
Merely two other publications aiming to describe checklist development have been 
identified [87, 88]. Both studies are literature searches combined with authors’ 
personal experience or “talk to the experts”. The results from these studies are mainly 
derived from aviation or a description of the development process for “specific” 
checklists in medicine. They also mainly focus on giving a step-by step strategy, and 
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to a lesser extend the underlying assumptions for organisational success in checklist 
development. 
In Table 7 the most important findings from Study II and III regarding checklist 
development are presented. 
• Maintain attention on the patient during the checklist routine 
• If possible, perform part of the checklist before the patient arrives 
• Consider informing the patient properly in advance 
• It takes some time to become accustomed to a checklist 
• Do not draw premature conclusions about usefulness and feasibility 
• Expect and prepare for scepticism 
• Be aware that the checklist may be used in situations (and locations), for 
which it initially was not intended 
• Consider to standardise equipment and workflow before implementing 
safety checklist. 
• Limit the length of the list to enhance feasibility and usefulness 
• Be careful with gradually extending well-adapted and accepted lists 
• Pay attention to the lay-out and graphical details of the list 
• Identify and prioritise items from adverse events 
• Content must directly reflect the specific operation 
• Use common professional and scientific terminology
                                                                                                                                  
Table 7. Important issues regarding checklist development and use (From Study II and 
III). 
In Study I the pre-induction checklist was developed in a stepwise manner. 
Unfortunately, we did not include all stakeholders in this process. All personnel 
participated during the piloting, but only consultants developed the list. As a result of 
the findings in Study II and III regarding assumptions for successful development and 
implantation, it was realised that the stepwise method used had major weaknesses.      
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5.4 Automaticity and checklist-fatigue 
Automaticity describes the ability to perform tasks or actions with only a minimum of 
active thinking [19]. People often refer to automaticity as “on auto pilot” or “as in my 
sleep”. Automaticity develops as results of numerous repetitions, and helps us to 
perform routine activities like drive a car, ride a bicycle or walk without being 
mentally exhausted. However, in the context of checklists there appears to be a risk 
associated with bypassing perception and reflection. If performing a checklist becomes 
only a ritualised automatic ceremony, the probability of missing an item increases. 
Then the checklist may become counter-effective or even represent a threat to patient 
safety. Automaticity has been associated with accidents in aviation [89] and 
medication errors in medicine [90]. 
During the field study at the nuclear power plant in Study III, a meltdown situation 
was simulated. The reactor operators were aware of automaticity and had developed a 
preventive three step communication approach; 1) reading the item on the checklist 
(verbally), 2) pointing out the action or measurements on the monitors (physically), 
and, 3) ensure eye contact with the co-worker (awareness). 
Checklist-fatigue is another threat and can be described as a situation where personnel 
have too many mandatory checks to perform. At best, this may cause interruption in 
workflow and thereby delays. But likely, and worse, it may undermine the safety 
culture and allow development of individually adapted random checks or shortcuts. 
Sceptic colleagues made us aware of someone’s “quality improvement fatigue” during 
the development of the pre-induction checklist in Study I. Their opinion affected the 
timing of the project. The implementation was scheduled to a period where no other 
patient safety projects were performed in the department. 
An outdated or not longer required checklist can also overburden staff, cause irritation, 
enhance scepticism, and generate fatigue [27, 88]. 
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5.5 Time spent and cost of checklist use 
There were critical comments on the time having to be spent on performing the 
checklist before the start of Study I. It took a median of 88.5 seconds (range 52 – 118) 
to perform the checklist when no items were missing. If an item was found missing the 
check was paused and continued when corrected. We did not measure the time spent to 
prepare or get ready to start the check. One could imagine that the checklist itself was 
quickly performed, but that time spent in the operating theatre before induction would 
increase. Therefore, we retrospectively measured from the patient charts, the mean 
time span from the patient arrived in the theatre to induction was started. Then the time 
used on the 502 study patients was compared with 502 patients prior to the study. 
There was a tendency, but not significant, of a reduction in “door – induction” time. 
One possible explanation is that the checklist streamlined the preparation and 
prevented delays due to missing or malfunctioning equipment. Perhaps the negative 
comments from some consultants prior to implementation of the checklist rather were 
expressions of a general frustration concerning the ever increasing load of 
documentation and administrative paperwork in general, than genuine checklist 
resistance. 
All the informants in Study III agreed that limiting the length of a checklist is 
essential. Reasons for this may be two-fold: Firstly, time itself has implications for 
both economy and safety. Secondly, is the feeling of feasibility and usefulness. Often, 
there are comprehensive guidelines supplying a checklist, to assist a more stepwise 
approach. Such guidelines will contain relevant background information explaining 
why certain activities are more important than others. In aviation each item on the 
checklist is described in comprehensive manuals. 
It has been stated that checklists may be cost-ineffective [91]. On the other hand, it has 
been claimed that the checklist is a cost saving strategy [92]. We have not been able to 
identify publications describing time spent performing neither the safe surgery 
checklist, nor other checklists. Further research on resistance towards checklists in 
general should also take time issues into consideration.  
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5.6 Non-technical skills and checklists 
Shortcomings in non-technical skills are reported to be contributing factors in adverse 
events in surgery [35, 93], anaesthesia [32, 94], and underuse of AE reporting systems 
[7]. In the next sections the terms “memory” and “situational awareness” are 
discussed. Memory will first be viewed from a psychological perspective. Thereafter 
the implications memory has on the need for checklist will be described.  
Memory 
Before the introduction of the pre-induction checklist in our department in 2008 (Study 
I), there were no system or written guidelines on what to check immediately before 
induction of anaesthesia. The system relied upon a perfect working- and prospective 
memory of the staff involved. 
Memory and complexity are two fundamental terms in quality and safety in medicine. 
Different types of memory have been discussed earlier (Table 2). In medicine long on-
call hours, work overload, stress, and fatigue are well known. Despite research 
showing impaired performance after long on-calls, the working hours especially for 
physicians remain unacceptable long. The evident impaired cognitive performance, 
especially memory, must to a higher degree be identified as a threat to patient safety. 
Hence, tools, such as checklists, should be considered and eventually implemented. 
All elective patients planned for general-, regional-, and local anaesthesia were 
included in Study I. Since the checklist potentially could delay induction, patients who 
required emergency surgery were excluded. Stress is associated with impaired 
prospective memory and situation awareness [15]. In an emergency or high stress 
situation, a checklist can create structure and overview and keep the team in the loop. 
After Study I was completed the checklist also was used for emergency cases. 
Situation awareness  
Situation awareness (SA) is the perception and understanding of environmental 
elements and surroundings [95]. SA is an active process involving awareness of what 
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is happening in the surroundings in order to understand how inputs, information, and 
events may have impact on the planned activity. Given a sufficient level of SA, one 
will know what is most important for handling the situation. Short term memory and 
perception are basic elements in SA. SA was first described in single-pilot air-to-air 
combat but has also been introduced to several other fields like driving a car, air traffic 
control, fire fighting, and medicine. These activities have common characteristics such 
as complexity and fatal outcome if significant adverse events occur. In medicine 
anaesthesiology, intensive care, and emergency medicine are some examples of 
specialities where the requirements for optimal SA are important.  
Impaired SA has been described as root causes in fatal aviation incidents [96], and is 
also described as fundamental for efficacious and correct decision-making in medicine 
[97]. If the checklist procedure interferes with workflow, leads to irritations, or disturb 
attention it may reduce the SA and thereby threaten patient safety. During Study I 
some the staff members were negative. Some informants had their full attention 
towards “defending” the study protocol while conducting the list (personal 
communication). In Study III one of the main findings was the HROs’ culture for 
team- and simulator training to incorporate checklists into daily workflow and work 
habits. It is likely to believe that targeted team training, before the start of Study I, 
could have reduced this perceived stress and impaired SA.  
A momentary loss of SA may lead to an incorrect understanding of a given situation 
and thereby impairing decision making. For anaesthetists serving several operating 
theatres at the same time, it is impossible to be continuously present. Jumping into an 
emergency situation “mid-stream”, trying to make sound decisions based on 
fragmented verbal or written information is difficult. In such situations, a checklist can 
help by creating more structure. A checklist can be a tool which forces the team to be 
gathered when performing team tasks. When disturbances occur, the checklist may 
also unify the team, increase awareness, keep everyone in the loop, and reduce the risk 
that individuals lose focus. 
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The Easter holiday occurred during the third week of the project. Despite preparation 
of the staff not on vacation, and informing new or unfamiliar personnel properly on the 
study aims, checklist use declined to 30%. At the same time, detection of errors 
increased to 46%. Operating team members change quite frequently in large 
organisations as ours, and even more frequently during holidays. Unfamiliar team 
composition combined with new equipment and high workload may increase the 
probability of AEs [98]. When workflow or personnel are deviating from normal, 
checklists may be even more important.   
5.7 High reliability organisations (HRO) 
Prevention and resilience 
In HROs, two main approaches are used to achieve reliable results; prevention and 
resilience [99]. Prevention is to identify possible harmful events or conditions, stop the 
chain of events before injury or loss occurs, and design systems to avoid them. To 
identify potential threats there must be a high level of anticipation. Prevention alone 
has its limitations when unforeseen situations emerge. Resilience is the ability to 
operate reliably under stress or unexpected situations. Resilience can be described with 
three characteristics; 1) maintaining functioning in spite of uncertainties, 2) ability to 
adapt, absorb, and “stretch” rather than collapse, and 3) ability to learn from and 
implement necessary changes based on experiences [24]. Despite their operational 
diversity, researchers have found many similarities in the way the HROs are organised 
and their safety culture [24, 100, 101].  
The environments and challenges are similar in health care and HROs, but health care 
is most often not defined as an HRO. Reasons for this can be the variation in reliability 
and resilience within organisations, hospitals, and teams [102]. It is widely accepted 
that experiences and lessons learned in HROs are transferable to health care [78, 103-
106]. It may be pertinent to cite Winston Churchill who asked the following: “Why 
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didn’t I know? Why didn’t my advisors know? Why wasn’t I told? Why didn’t I ask?” 
[24].
5.8 Methodological considerations and ethics 
Validity 
The issues of validity and reliability in qualitative research differ from quantitative 
science by the lack of numerical proofs and statistical generalisability [107]. Internal 
validity can be defined whether the study investigates what it is meant to, whereas
external validity ask in what contexts the findings can be applied [108]. Qualitative 
researchers have to make different approaches to make assertions of validity. 
Reflexivity and transferability are terms closely related to aspects of validity [75, 108]. 
Reflexivity can be defined as the degree of influence that the researcher exerts, either 
intentionally or unintentionally, on the findings [107].  Reflexivity is also about 
preconception, meaning the researchers expectations of what questions should be 
asked and what the answers will be [76]. All researchers, both in quantitative and 
qualitative studies, have their personal “backpack” of previous personal or 
professional experiences. The danger lies in not being aware of one’s own prejudices 
and assumptions. It is not a matter of “if” the researcher is objective or not, but of 
being transparent. 
Study II was based on focus group interviews in which nine nurses and five physicians 
participated, all from the same department. All the informants had experiences with 
the pre-induction checklist (Study I). They were also all familiar with each other and 
had from 1 to 23 years of experience.  
The main researcher (OT) has previously been working in the department, and was to 
some extent familiar with the participants, the department’s social setting, and its 
ordinary work flow. All the informants were also aware of OT’s interests in checklists. 
A researcher’s proximity to the informants and their culture is both strength and a 
52
challenge. On one hand, it enables a deeper understanding and allows for “reading 
between the lines”, particularly when the informants share experiences that contain a 
longer history or generally known conflicts, or require a cultural understanding for 
interpreting the meaning of comments. On the other hand, it is important to separate 
own experience and knowledge from those of the participants [76]. The interviewer’s 
interest in checklists could have made the informants more willing to report positive 
experiences rather than difficulties with the checklist. The participants were 
encouraged to speak freely, and a range of both benefits and difficulties were actually 
reported. The chief consultant was, intentionally, not invited as an informant in order 
to prevent potentially pressure as to express positive experiences.  
In Study III the informants were met for the first time at the day of the interview, but 
they had all been through a short telephone interview verifying that they met the 
inclusion criteria for being key informants. They were all prior to the interviews 
informed about the background and the aims of the study, and former research on 
quality and safety issues. Some of the HROs had restrictions and limitations to visitors 
and interviews. In order to gain access to perform interviews it was a necessity to show 
that we had an understanding and experience with checklists. Unlike Study II, our 
presence in Study III probably did not affect the informants to any great degree. My 
experience from helicopter emergency services and both sharp- and blunt-end 
experience from checklist use and development enabled and constructed a cohesion 
that would not be apparent to an outsider without such a background.   
Transferability, or external validity, is about how our results can be transferred to 
other persons and other settings [109]. A common concern as to qualitative methods is 
the small sample size which precludes transferability [74]. These concerns have 
traditionally been claimed by quantitative researchers, and are part of the “quantitative 
research paradigm” where knowledge is defined as facts which can be empirically 
proved [110]. Medicine and clinical knowledge also involve human factors such as 
experiences, communication and opinions. Qualitative research on the other hand, has 
limitations in transferability, but a thorough, transparent, and systematic methodology 
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will help the reader to use the results, not as facts but as a guide for reflexion on 
clinical decisions.  
Study I was performed in an anaesthesia and intensive care department of a tertiary 
teaching hospital. The background of the study was reported adverse events where 
some contributing factors had been identified as lack of appropriate airway 
management equipment and wrong use of or missing medications. Most 
anaesthesiologist will recognise such events in their clinical practice [111, 112]. In 
2007, we were not able to identify a validated methodology to develop and design 
specific medical safety checklists from previously published studies. This obliged us to 
develop a self-designed stepwise method (Figure 3). The method included adverse 
event reports, literature search, expert opinions, a Delphi approach, and pilot testing. 
We believe this rather thorough process was essential in order to generate a useful and 
feasible checklist, and this experience can be useful for others regardless of speciality 
and local differences.  
The low compliance was affected by local factors, but implementation of the checklist 
will probably generate critical voices elsewhere. The literature also confirms this [53, 
86]. 
The findings in Study I reflect the informants’ personal experiences and opinions. 
These results can be used in further evaluation and development in our department. 
However, their validity in other contexts, in other countries or cultures is not certain. 
The main statements identified in Study II, combined with similar findings in the 
literature and research reports, increases the transferability indicating that the findings 
may be useful to others.  
The main question regarding transferability in Study III is whether experiences with 
checklists in non-medical HROs are relevant in medicine. These organisations have 
decades of sharp- and blunt-end experience with checklists, and are often referred to in 
the medical literature [24, 25, 113]. Some have questioned whether medicine has gone 
too far in translating checklist experiences from HROs in general [114]. Interviewing 
and visiting the HROs in Study III revealed that these organisations have remarkably 
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similar challenges with safety as health care. Their long tradition with safety checklists 
and the thorough system for revisions and validation makes their experiences and 
observations relevant to medicine. 
Study design
In Study I we designed implemented and measured the effect of a pre-induction 
checklist. The outcome measures were the identified number of missing items, 
personnel compliance and the time spent. Another outcome measure could have been 
morbidity, mortality, or the incidence of adverse events before and after the 
introduction of the checklist. Conducting a study with these outcome measures would 
have been a challenge for two reasons. Firstly, the number of anaesthesia related 
deaths are very low (0,1 – 3,3 /10.000 anaesthetics) [115]. Therefore, the number of 
patients needed would have been very high and had required a multi-center design or a 
long study period. After Study I was completed, two studies have showed a decrease in 
morbidity and mortality after introduction of pre- and post-operative checklists [46, 
49]. The numbers of included patients in these studies were 3733 and 3820, 
respectively. Secondly, underreporting of adverse events makes it hard to compare the 
numbers before and after implementation of a checklist. We believe underreporting 
exists in our department, as reported elsewhere [2, 116]. 
Someone might claim that a weakness is that there was not a control group in Study I. 
We could have divided the seven operating theatres or the nurses and doctors into two 
groups, introduced the checklist in one group and used an observational approach on 
the other group. A blinding would have been practically impossible. The aim of Study 
I was three-fold; to develop, implement and measure the effect of a checklist. Given 
these aims a comparison to a control group would not have given any valuable or 
useable information. Absence of control groups is common in quality improvements 
studies [117, 118].  
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If we had chosen a classical statistical method in Study I the results would have been 
less informative. The findings of a special cause of variation during Easter holiday 
would not have been identified, nor had the effect on the chief consultant’s 
admonitions regarding compliance been described. Another benefit of using SPC and 
control charts was the opportunity for the nurses and physicians to follow the process 
on a weekly basis. Each week the updated chart enabled the participants to see 
changes. The poster was placed on a wall outside one operating theatre. This wall 
became a bulletin board where comments and important messages also were posted. 
SPC is a feasible method provided that the probability for a positive or negative 
outcome does not change during the study period (e.g. the probability for successful 
intubation will be affected if the potential difficult airways patients are excluded from 
the start, but included when the skills are improving). In Study I the setting and the 
included patients were the same throughout the study period.  
One limitation may be that we conducted only two focus groups in Study II. The rule 
of thumb is to stop collecting data when more groups probably will not provide 
meaningful new insight [73]. The discussions in the two interviews were fairly similar; 
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thus we considered that a third group would probably not enrich the findings to any 
greater extend. Since 14 of total 34 potential informants had participated in the 
interviews, it also would have been a practical challenge to organise further groups. If 
we had suspected that important data was missing we could have used additional 
methods, such as individual interviews or questionnaires to expand the results (method 
triangulation). However, conducting a low number of interviews is not infrequent. 
Eleven previous publications have conducted only one focus group [119]. Although 
group interviews are ideal for exploring common experiences, more sensitive or 
personal attitudes may have been omitted.  
Understanding, rather than avoiding, bias 
In quantitative research a key element is to eliminate bias. In quality improvement (QI) 
research, the key issue is to measure the effect of an action or intervention in a real 
clinical setting. In clinical practice quality improvement interventions influence the 
participants’ communication, attitudes, and workflow. Before Study I, all participants 
were “sensitised” through informative e-mails, personal letters, morning briefs, and 
training during the development of the list. In traditionally quantitative research, or in 
a laboratory setting, these elements could have been described as bias. In QI research 
this “bias” has an intrinsic value as long as they are identified and part of the analysis. 
To understand the effect of an intervention it is important to also consider the culture 
and context in which the study is undertaken. The operation theatres have limitations 
compared to a laboratory where the possibility to eliminate all possible confounding 
factors exists. We did not try to eliminate all other influencing factors. Instead, we 
tried to describe them in order to better understand the implementation process and 
report the findings.  
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Ethical considerations 
The studies were approved by the local Institutional Research Ethics Committee 
(REK), the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) and the head of the 
Anaesthesia and Intensive Care department according to current regulations. 
In agreement with REK, the patients were not informed that the checklist was 
performed in Study I. We considered that it would be a potential burden to the patient 
to get information about a QI project that had no influence on normal clinical 
management of the anaesthetic or surgical procedure. On the other hand, it would have 
been ethically difficult to drop the checklist after we saw the positive effect on 
preparedness.  
In Study II we obtained written consent from the informants to participate in the focus 
groups. The questions in the interviews were not personally sensitive, but we were 
prepared to stop discussions on colleagues that were not present or other sensitive 
topics not concerning the project. None of the above occurred. 
In Study III the informants represented civil and military aviation, nuclear power 
production, off-shore drilling, submarine and military operations. They all had 
restrictions in sharing standard operation procedures and experiences were, to some 
degree, classified. Before the interviews and field visits the informants were told that it 
was there own responsibility to consider what type of information they could share. 
The results were also returned to the informants for validation and final approval 
before the paper was submitted for publication, resulting in only minor revisions.
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6. Conclusions 
In this thesis I have described the effects of a pre-induction safety checklist, explored 
the personnel’s acceptance and experience with this list, and further examined the 
experiences from non-medical high reliability organisations, and discussed the 
relevancy to health care. In accordance with the aims of this thesis, the following 
conclusions can be drawn: 
A pre-induction checklist is a useful tool to detect missing or malfunctioning 
equipment. It is possible to develop and use such a list even in a hectic and stressful 
clinical environment. Performing a pre-induction checklist does not increase time 
spent in the operating theatre, however staff compliance is a challenge. 
The nurses’ and physicians’ suggest several issues and actions that seem to be 
important during checklist development and use. These experiences are summarised in 
five categories; checklists can divert attention away from the patient, interrupt the 
workflow, supportive and sceptical attitude from colleagues, improved confidence, and 
highlights the need for standardisation. Informants from non-medical HROs emphasise 
the assumption of a recognised and predefined problem for which the checklist is 
developed. A close cooperation between sharp-end personnel and the management to 
create a feeling of ownership is also important. The checklist must be short and well 
designed, and simulation is a necessary part of checklist implementation and revision.  
Choosing the best approach for achieving staff compliance when introducing a 
checklist, is not as simply as it may sound. The studies presented in this thesis provide 
some new insight in the challenges of developing and implementing checklists. 
59
7. Future research  
Merely providing checklists to healthcare workers will not empower them to actually 
use this tool or create a safety culture alone. Just having a checklist on a piece of paper 
will necessarily not lead to any changes. I suggest two main aims for further research: 
• The checklist in this thesis differs from the WHO surgical checklist in many 
ways. The most important disparity is the magnitude of the projects. We did not 
have financial resources or time, similar to most other, to have safety managers 
motivating for the process. It is likely to believe that the large and highly 
profiled WHO safe surgery checklist project have less negative participants in 
the pilot phase. The challenges with resistance to change have surfaced when 
the checklist were implemented locally around the world. Future research 
should be focused on challenges of local adaption and wise methods for 
overcoming resistance to change. 
• HROs are far ahead of medicine in checklist development and use. Their 
experiences are a valuable and under-utilized source for learning how to 
improve and use checklists wisely in health care. Future research should 
explore both disparities and similarities between healthcare and HROs and the 
transferability of their experiences with safety issues in general. 
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